United Nations S/2010/275

Security Council

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Letter dated 1 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report on the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Japan in April 2010 (see annex). The document was prepared under my own responsibility, following consultations with other members of the Security Council. I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukio **Takasu**
Permanent Representative of Japan
to the United Nations

10-38511 (E) 080610

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Annex to the letter dated 1 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Assessment of the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Japan (April 2010)

Introduction

Under the presidency of Japan in April 2010, the Security Council addressed various thematic and regional issues, including peacebuilding, working methods of the Council, women and peace and security, and the situations in Iraq, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, Western Sahara, the Middle East, Somalia, Haiti, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. The Council held 13 official meetings, of which 10 were public, including three open debates, and 12 consultations of the whole, including an informal briefing by the Secretary-General on his recent travels. The Council adopted three resolutions, two of which extended the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping missions, and two presidential statements on thematic issues. The President also made two statements to the press on behalf of the Security Council.

The Council observed minutes of silence at the start of its meetings on 12 and 13 April in tribute to the loss of the President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, his wife and 95 other members of the Government of Poland in a plane crash on 10 April. On 8 April, the Security Council issued a statement to the press on the passing of the Soviet and Russian diplomat, Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

In April, the Council relocated to its new temporary premises owing to the implementation of the capital master plan. The Council discussed, on numerous occasions, access issues of non-members to the "quiet room" and of the press to the area around its entrance in order to ensure equivalent access as before the Council's relocation.

Africa

Chad and the Central African Republic

On 8 April, in consultations of the whole, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, briefed the Security Council on the ongoing discussions between the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic. Members of the Council expressed various concerns with regard to a drawdown of the military component of MINURCAT.

On 23 April, again in consultations of the whole, the Under-Secretary-General gave the Security Council another briefing on the situation in Chad and the Central African Republic. The Council had intensive discussions concerning the mandate of MINURCAT, which was set to expire on 15 May.

Côte d'Ivoire

On 15 April, in consultations of the whole, the Council heard a briefing by Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire. The members of the Council expressed their appreciation to Ambassador Viotti for her updated briefing and welcomed the midterm report of the Group of Experts submitted to the Council on 18 March (S/2010/179, annex).

Council members expressed concerns about the volatile situation in Côte d'Ivoire and about the findings of the Group of Experts, in particular, for the reported arms embargo violations in the north and the south. Some members were very concerned about the rehabilitation of Ivorian Air Force aircraft. Commenting on the stalled electoral process in the country, some members stated that there was a need to take additional measures if the process continued to experience delays in the coming months. At the same time, some Council members pointed out difficulties in implementing some of the recommendations of the Group of Experts. The members of the Council agreed that they should seek to enhance the capacity of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the Group of Experts to monitor the arms embargo.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

On 13 April, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Alan Doss, briefed the Council on the situation in the country and on proposals for the reconfiguration and drawdown of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), based in part on the technical assessment mission conducted from 22 February to 5 March.

Afterwards, in consultations of the whole, the President of the Council introduced a new practice of beginning deliberations by summarizing the private meeting held by the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries. The President noted that during the meeting with those countries, which had been held one week earlier on 7 April, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General briefed the delegations on the Mission's protection of civilians mandate, the Amani Leo military operation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or repatriation and resettlement and MONUC support to Government-led efforts on security sector reform. The Council proceeded to have an intensive discussion on the mandate of MONUC, including the proposals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a drawdown of the Mission.

The Council originally scheduled its mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Rwanda from 16 to 23 April. On 23 April, owing to the erupting volcano in Iceland and disruptions in air travel, the Council agreed to reschedule its mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 13 to 16 May.

Guinea-Bissau

Owing to events involving the detention and subsequent release of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior by members of the Guinea-Bissau military on 1 April, the Council released a statement to the press on that day, in which the members expressed their concern over the situation and urged all parties to avoid acts of

violence, uphold constitutional order and respect the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau. The members also stressed the need for the parties to preserve ongoing peace consolidation efforts and to resolve their differences through dialogue. On 6 April, pursuant to a request by Nigeria, the Council, in consultations of the whole, listened to a briefing from the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, on the situation since the events of 1 April. Members again expressed the views that all parties should refrain from acts of violence, uphold the Constitution and preserve the country's post-conflict progress. Members also commented on the importance of promoting security sector reform and the necessity of addressing illegal drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau.

Somalia piracy

On 6 April, in consultations of the whole, under "Other matters", the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Vitaly Churkin, introduced a draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to present to the Council within three months a report on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. On 27 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1918 (2010), by which it requested the Secretary-General to present the said report.

Sudan

On 8 April, in consultations of the whole, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations briefed the Council on preparations for elections in the Sudan. He discussed the boycott by some of the opposition parties, technical logistical challenges facing the National Elections Commission, electoral support of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to the Commission and issues regarding election observers.

On 27 April, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, Haile Menkerios, briefed the Council on the Sudan, focusing on the situation on the ground since the announcement of election results by the National Elections Commission the day before. He emphasized that UNMIS support for establishing conditions for peaceful referendums and post-referendum processes would now be the Mission's highest priority. In that regard he underlined the implementation of the Mission's strategy for protection of civilians and contingency planning.

After the briefing by the Special Representative, the Council moved to consultations of the whole. The President of the Council began discussions with a summary of the Council's private meeting on 9 April with troop- and police-contributing countries, which had focused on preparations for elections, in particular UNMIS technical and logistical support to the National Elections Commission, mandate implementation, activities of UNMIS and planning for the referendums in 2011.

On 29 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1919 (2010), by which it extended the mandate of UNMIS for a further period of 12 months, with reference to all of its previous resolutions concerning Sudan. In resolution 1919 (2010), the Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide in his quarterly reports a detailed plan of measures UNMIS was taking to support the referendums and popular consultation processes, information on the status of United Nations engagement with the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the parties'

progress concerning the critical tasks that would need to be accomplished post-referendum and, as appropriate, information on UNMIS planning in consultation with the parties concerning the United Nations presence in the post-interim period in the Sudan.

Western Sahara

On 9 April, the Council and the countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) heard a briefing by Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, Director of the Asia and Middle East Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He gave an overview of the Mission's activities over the past year and described the Mission's programme of confidence-building measures, urging donors to support it.

On 15 April, in consultations of the whole, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, Hany Abdel-Aziz, and the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, briefed the Council on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2010/175). While Council members welcomed the parties' continuing commitment to the process of negotiations and their willingness to engage in the preparatory informal talks, many expressed regret for the lack of substantial progress in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations and also the view that the parties must demonstrate further political will for finding a solution.

On 30 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1920 (2010), extending the mandate of MINURSO for one year.

Americas

Haiti

On 28 April, the Council held a debate on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Mission, Edmond Mulet, briefed the Council on the activities of MINUSTAH after the January earthquake and on its future role. He stressed that the next 12 to 18 months would be a period of great challenges and risks for Haiti, and expressed his view that Haiti and the international community were capable of managing and mitigating those risks. Following the briefing, the Prime Minister of Haiti, Jean-Max Bellerive, made a statement on the current situation in Haiti, urging the international community to continue with its support efforts.

All the Council members took the floor, followed by nine non-members and representatives of the Organization of American States and the European Union. Speakers expressed solidarity with Haiti and paid tribute to MINUSTAH and the United Nations personnel and recognized the Mission's important contributions to ensuring stability in Haiti after the earthquake. Members also acknowledged that MINUSTAH would have a critical role to play in support of the Haitian authorities and the Haitian people. In addition, delegations stressed that MINUSTAH and the international community would need to provide long-term capacity-building support for the Government of Haiti to restore and strengthen its operational capacity.

Representatives also expressed views about the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General on MINUSTAH (S/2010/200 and Corr.1), which was issued on 22 April.

Asia

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

At the open debate on 14 April, the Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, who said that efforts aimed at bringing about the conditions for a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks had continued. He said that the situation on the ground remained fragile and a crisis of confidence between the parties had so far prevented the resumption of talks. He stressed the continuing support of the United Nations for efforts to resume the peace process as well as for the Palestinian State-building agenda and briefed the Council about developments in that regard, including the convening of the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to the Palestinians in Madrid. He also addressed the Secretary-General's visit to the League of Arab States summit and gave a briefing on the situation in Lebanon, noting that in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) it remained generally quiet.

Following the briefing, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, the Permanent Representative of Israel and 18 other speakers addressed the Council, and Council members also made statements. Many speakers stressed that there was no alternative to achieving a solution other than through negotiations. They expressed support for the effort of the United States of America to start the proximity talks between the Israeli and Palestinian sides and at the same time stressed that it should lead to direct talks. A number of members urged all parties to abide by their obligations under the road map, the Madrid terms of reference, the Arab Peace Initiative and relevant Security Council resolutions, which would contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts and, ultimately, to attainment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East. A number of participants expressed concern about the situation in Gaza and the need to address its humanitarian situation. Speakers also touched on the situation in Lebanon and expressed support for the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and for UNIFIL.

Lebanon

On 29 April, during closed consultations, the Council received a briefing by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), Terje Roed-Larsen, on the eleventh semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution (S/2010/193). The Special Envoy recalled and emphasized that the primary goal of resolution 1559 (2004) was to strengthen the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon. He reported that many of its provisions had now been implemented, but noted that the presence of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, in particular their weapons, continued to pose a threat not only to the stability of the country, but also to the region. He stressed that the Secretary-General was of the view that the best way to address the disarmament of armed groups was through a

Lebanese-led political process. The Special Envoy reported that the United Nations took seriously the information provided to it on arms smuggling into Lebanon, but did not have the means to independently verify it. He reiterated the call on all States to abide by the arms embargo. He reported that the United Nations had called on Israel to cease the overflights and also that the Secretary-General had urged his Israeli interlocutors to find an early solution to the issue of Ghajar.

Members of the Council welcomed the formation of the new government in Lebanon as well as the progress in bilateral relations between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, including the intention of the two countries to delineate their border. They stressed the importance of strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon. Council members noted the need for all States to abide by the arms embargo and reiterated their support for and the importance of the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).

Iraq

On 6 April, the Assistant Secretary-General for Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts, and Controller, Jun Yamazaki, briefed the Council on the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1905 (2009) (S/2010/166) on the activities of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board in overseeing the Development Fund for Iraq. He also discussed legal issues and options to be considered in implementing successor arrangements and assessing the Government of Iraq's progress in preparing for those successor arrangements to the Development Fund for Iraq. Afterwards, the President of the Board of Supreme Audit and Head of the Committee of Financial Experts, Abdul Basit Turki Saeed, briefed the Council on the report of the Government of Iraq pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 1905 (2009), providing an action plan and timeline for the transition to a post-Development Fund mechanism. After the briefing, the Council held consultations of the whole on the issue. Council members expressed satisfaction that the Government of Iraq had submitted the report and provided an action plan. They also noted the importance of ensuring payments to the Compensation Fund, pursuant to paragraph 21 of Council resolution 1483 (2003), into a post-Development Fund mechanism. Additionally, some Council members requested clarification on the privileges and immunities that Iraq requested to be granted in a post-Development Fund mechanism.

General issues

Briefing by the Secretary-General

On 15 April, in consultations of the whole, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General on his recent visits to five Central Asian countries, Vienna and Washington, D.C. In his briefing, he commended the success of the Nuclear Security Summit held on 12 and 13 April, welcomed the new United States-Russian Federation deal on nuclear disarmament, and noted the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the global actions against nuclear terrorism. He also confirmed that he would propose holding a Security Council meeting to follow up on the commitments made at the Nuclear Security Summit. Members of the Council

welcomed the Secretary-General's commitment to nuclear security and his proposals.

Regarding his visit to Vienna, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that he made a statement at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, commending its multidimensional security efforts and its cooperation with the United Nations. He also mentioned the Chief Executives Board meeting he held at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, as well as his bilateral meetings with high-level counterparts in the Government of Austria.

In discussing his recent visit to Central Asian countries, the Secretary-General emphasized the role of the United Nations in assisting economic development in those countries and the importance of addressing transborder crime, climate change, the situation in Afghanistan, human rights and various other socio-economic and political issues. He further discussed the situation of the Aral Sea, recent events in Kyrgyzstan and the hydropower station issue in Tajikistan. In reporting on developments in Kyrgyzstan, he included mention of the recent appointment of his Special Envoy to Kyrgyzstan, Jan Kubis, and welcomed the arrangement between the Provisional Government and the former President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, enabling Mr. Bakiyev to leave the country. Members of the Council commended the role of the United Nations in stabilizing the Central Asian region, especially through the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia.

Peace and security in Africa — support for African Union peacekeeping

On 12 April, in consultations of the whole, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Susana Malcorra, briefed the Council on the latest report of the Secretary-General on the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, the United Nations presence in Addis Ababa, African Union capacity-building and African Union peacekeeping activities. During their discussion Council members welcomed efforts to further strengthen the strategic partnership. In considering further support for the peacekeeping activities of the African Union, members noted that for some African countries enormous gaps in their military capacity limited the ability to contribute to peacekeeping and the potential that regional organizations could play in filling them, such as the African Union and the European Union.

Post-conflict peacebuilding

On 16 April, the Council held an open debate on post-conflict peacebuilding on the basis of the concept paper submitted by Japan (S/2010/167, annex). The debate was chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Katsuya Okada. In his opening statement to start the discussion, he posed the following questions: why do conflicts recur after a ceasefire is successfully concluded? and why does peace often not take root in post-conflict countries? Following the Foreign Minister, the Secretary-General addressed the Council, stating that three keys for peacebuilding were to deliver peace dividends to conflict-affected people, to build State capacity and to take a comprehensive approach that encompassed political, security and social dimensions.

The Council then heard briefings by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Zalmai Rassoul, the Minister of Defence of Sierra Leone, Alfred Palo Conteh, the Minister of Justice of Timor-Leste, Lucia Lucia Maria Lobato, in which

they gave an overview of peacebuilding efforts in their countries and offered lessons learned. The Managing Director of the World Bank, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, also briefed the Council, stating that achieving the best results in peacebuilding required focusing on country context, partnership and accountability.

The members of the Council stressed the importance of an integrated approach for peacebuilding which strengthened coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities, and they noted the important role that the United Nations could play in supporting national authorities in their efforts to develop peacebuilding strategies that addressed priority needs. Council members also stressed the importance of national ownership and the development of national capacity in peacebuilding. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sven Alkalaj, participated in the debate, emphasizing that a sustainable security sector required police and military reform, as well as impartial and accessible judicial and law enforcement sectors. The Permanent Representative of Germany, Peter Wittig, who took part in the discussion in his capacity as the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission, stated that the Commission would continue to explore measures to deepen the United Nations collaboration with the main actors at the country level, promote mutual accountability between the host Governments and partners, and monitor progress towards meeting critical peacebuilding objectives. In total, 49 speakers addressed the Council.

Following the debate, the Council adopted a statement by the President of the Council (S/PRST/2010/7), which emphasized the critical importance of post-conflict peacebuilding as the foundation for building sustainable peace and development in the aftermath of conflict, and recognized that sustainable peacebuilding required an integrated approach which strengthened coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities.

Women and peace and security

On 27 April, the Council held a public meeting during which it heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, and the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Rachel Mayanja. The Special Representative briefed the Council on her priorities agenda and her recent visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and stressed the importance of prevention of sexual violence in armed conflict and ending impunity. The Special Adviser briefed the Council on the Secretary-General's report on women and peace and security (S/2010/173), in which he proposed a set of indicators for use at the global level to track the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). At the end of the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/8), which reiterated the Council's support for the mandate of the Special Representative, took note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2010/173) and expressed the Council's intention to take action on a comprehensive set of indicators in October 2010. Following the meeting, the Council held consultations of the whole to hear a briefing by the Special Representative on more specific findings from her visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to exchange views on how to address effectively the issue of sexual violence in the country.

Working methods: implementation of the measures set out in the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2006/507)

On 22 April, the Council convened an open debate on its working methods. The issue had last been the subject of a open debate in the Council on 27 August 2008 under the presidency of Belgium. The Council considered the implementation of the measures set out in the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2006/507) that addressed such issues as agenda, briefings, documentation, informal consultations, meetings, the programme of work, resolutions, presidential statements, subsidiary bodies and newly elected members. The debate was based on the concept paper distributed by Japan on 5 April (S/2010/165, annex), in which it proposed that the discussion focus on three areas of key importance to the Council members and non-members alike: transparency, interaction with non-members and efficiency.

All the members of the Council and 38 non-members made statements, including Liechtenstein on behalf of the group of five small countries (S-5), Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Luxembourg on behalf of the Benelux countries, Finland on behalf of the Nordic countries, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, representing the Caribbean Community. Most delegations stressed the importance of the Council's continuous efforts to improve its openness to non-members of the Council and the general public, while ensuring its ability to act effectively and efficiently. Most representatives of non-members welcomed the Council's increased transparency and enhanced communications with international and regional organizations and with interested countries such as troop-contributing countries. Some delegations praised the increased transparency of sanctions committees in the process of listing and de-listing. Some delegations stated that the question of the working methods should be linked to the overall reform of the Council. Despite noting improvements in recent years, most non-members called for fuller implementation of the note by the President in order to improve transparency and interaction with the wider membership.

The Council planned to follow up on the discussion in its Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, which Japan serves as the Chair.

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Security Council

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28 May 2010

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of China on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 28 May 2010 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations stating that Mr. Yang Tao has been appointed alternate representative of China on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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United Nations S/2010/277

Security Council

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4 June 2010

Original: English

Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Spain, United States of America and Uruguay: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Haiti, in particular its resolutions 1908 (2010), 1892 (2009), 1840 (2008), 1780 (2007), 1743 (2007), 1702 (2006), 1658 (2006), 1608 (2005), 1576 (2004) and 1542 (2004),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,

Recognizing the significant devastation that has been suffered by the Government and people of Haiti, expressing concern regarding the new challenges and threats as a result of the earthquake of 12 January 2010, and stressing the need for MINUSTAH to continue to focus its work on ensuring Haiti's security and stability as currently mandated by the Security Council,

Sharing the Secretary-General's assessment of the impact of the earthquake which has not destroyed the gains towards stabilization made in the past few years but has created new obstacles as well as new opportunities,

Recognizing the need for expanded assistance by the international community to the Government of Haiti in order to allow State institutions to continue operations, provide basic services and build State capacity, and acknowledging the valuable supporting role MINUSTAH can play in this regard,

Welcoming the establishment of priorities by the Government of Haiti in its Action Plan for National Recovery and Development presented at the Haiti International Donors' Conference and encouraging the international community to align their activities with the Action Plan,

Welcoming the significant contributions of the international community, particularly at the International Donors' Conference "Towards a New Future for Haiti" held on 31 March 2010, and urging donors to fulfil their pledges in a timely manner,

Commending the extraordinary efforts undertaken by the United Nations to respond to the earthquake, recognizing the critical role of MINUSTAH in ensuring stability and security in Haiti and also recognizing the complementary roles MINUSTAH and the United Nations Country Team have fulfilled to date in assisting Haiti in its recovery efforts, and reaffirming the authority of the Special

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Representative of the Secretary-General in the coordination and conduct of all activities of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Haiti,

Stressing the leading role of the Government of Haiti in its post-disaster recovery and reconstruction process and underlining the necessity for increased coordination and complementary efforts among all United Nations actors and other relevant stakeholders in assisting the Government in this regard,

Reaffirming the need for the Haitian authorities to continue their efforts to promote and protect human rights, including through strengthening national human rights institutions, as well as putting an end to impunity and ensuring the rule of law and security,

Stressing the importance of holding municipal, legislative and presidential elections in a timely manner, welcoming the Haitian authorities' intention to do so, and encouraging all political parties and relevant stakeholders to work together towards this end and to promote the participation of women in the electoral process,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report (S/2010/200) of 22 April 2010, and its recommendations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as described in section 1 of operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1542 (2004),

1. *Authorizes* the deployment of a further 680 police in addition to the police strength authorized by resolution 1908 (2010), as a temporary surge capacity with clearly defined objectives, and a particular focus on building the capacity of the Haitian National Police;

2. *Decides*, therefore, that MINUSTAH will consist of a military component of up to 8,940 troops of all ranks and of a police component of up to 4,391 police and that it will keep the new levels of troops and police in MINUSTAH under close and regular review, including through the electoral period and subsequent constitutional transfer of power, and requests the Secretary-General to include in his upcoming report to the Council an assessment of the implementation of resolution 1908 and the present resolution;

3. *Reiterates* that the ownership and primary responsibility for stabilization and development lies with the Government and people of Haiti, and recognizes the supporting role of MINUSTAH in this regard;

4. *Recognizes* the need for MINUSTAH to assist the Government of Haiti in providing adequate protection of the population, with particular attention to the needs of internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, including through additional joint community policing in the camps along with strengthened mechanisms to address sexual and gender-based violence; and to tackle the risk of a resurgence in gang violence, organized crime and trafficking of children;

5. *Requests* MINUSTAH to continue, within its current mandate, its collaboration with OCHA and the United Nations Country Team in supporting the humanitarian and recovery efforts and further encourages all actors to continue to engage in joint planning and coordination at the national and local level;

6. *Underscores* the importance that the planning documents for the military and police components, such as the concept of operations and rules of engagement,

be regularly updated, as appropriate, and be in line with the provisions of all its relevant resolutions, and requests the Secretary-General to report on them to the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries;

7. *Encourages* MINUSTAH to provide logistical support and technical expertise, within available means, to assist the Government of Haiti, as requested, to continue operations to build the capacity of its rule of law institutions at the national and local level, and to speed up the implementation of the government's resettlement strategy for displaced persons, in the knowledge that such measures are temporary and will be phased out as Haitian national capacity grows;

8. *Requests* MINUSTAH to continue its support to the Haitian Government and to the Provisional Electoral Council, as requested, in the preparation and conduct of Haiti's elections, and to coordinate international electoral assistance to Haiti in cooperation with other international stakeholders including the OAS;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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8 June 2010
English
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Letter dated 27 May 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the final communiqué of the thirteenth meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea, held in Conakry on 15 and 16 May 2010 (see annex).

The Government of Guinea would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council in connection with the item entitled "Peace consolidation in West Africa".

(*Signed*) Alpha Ibrahima **Sow**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-39491 (E) 090610 110610

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Annex to the letter dated 27 May 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Thirteenth meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea

Conakry, 15 and 16 May 2010

Final communiqué

1. The thirteenth meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea (the Group)[1] was held in Conakry on 15 and 16 May 2010.

2. The Group held successive discussions with the Transitional Prime Minister, the Vice-Chairpersons of the National Transitional Council, the Minister of Territorial Administration and Political Affairs and the representative of the Independent National Electoral Commission, and also with the spokespersons of Forces vives, Alliance Nationale pour le Renouveau and the Bloc of Patriotic Forces. The Group considered the report of the joint ECOWAS-African Union-United Nations mission of experts on security sector reform.

3. The Group was received by Brigadier General Sékouba Konaté, President of the Transition and Interim Head of State, who reiterated his determination to fully respect the pledge made to the people of Guinea and the international community to hold presidential elections on 27 June 2010. The Group congratulated him in that regard and encouraged him to continue his efforts.

4. The Group welcomed the progress made in the transitional process. In that regard, the Group took note of the Decree of 6 May 2010 setting the date for the presidential election and the Decree of 7 May 2010 on the promulgation of the revised Constitution. It also encouraged the Guinean authorities to promulgate the revised Electoral Code as soon as possible and to bring the electoral timetable into line with the legal texts. It paid tribute to the commitment, determination and spirit of compromise that had prevailed among all stakeholders, as well as the unity of purpose and spirit of cooperation demonstrated by the members of the Group, which had helped to achieve those significant results.

5. The Group welcomed the commitment shown by all stakeholders and the entire political class to respect the date of the presidential election and to abide by Point 8 of the Ouagadougou Joint Declaration, in accordance with which the Interim Head of State, the members of the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), the Prime Minister, the members of the Transitional

[1] In addition to the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the following organizations and countries attended the meeting: the United Nations, the European Union, the Mano River Union, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; the permanent members of the Security Council, namely the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation and China; a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, namely Nigeria (which holds the chairmanship of ECOWAS); Malawi (which holds the chairmanship of the African Union); Germany, Spain, Japan and Canada; Burkina Faso (the Mediator in the Guinea crisis); and Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Senegal (as guests).

Government, the President and members of the National Transitional Council, as well as members of the defence and security forces in active service, would not be candidates in the presidential election.

6. Regarding the preparations for the elections, the Group welcomed the significant progress made in finalizing the voter registry and the emerging consensus around it, and also welcomed the start of the registration of candidates for the presidential election. It took note of the substantial financial assistance from Guinea's partners, who had reiterated their promise to support the electoral process. In the same vein, the Group commended the Government for releasing part of the resources necessary for the electoral process and encouraged it to release the remainder.

7. The Group expressed its gratitude to the partners who had provided their technical assistance to the electoral process and invited them to continue to do so and to increase their support until the holding of the legislative elections.

8. The Group urged the Guinean authorities to adopt relevant legislation on security arrangements for the electoral process as soon as possible and to identify specific related requirements so that partners could contribute towards them. Similarly, the Group invited partners to finalize their plans for the deployment of electoral observers and reiterated its readiness to support the deployment of an ECOWAS civil-security observer mission, if so requested by the authorities.

9. On the eve of the launch of the electoral campaign, the Group had urgently appealed to the Guinean people, particularly the leaders and members of all political movements, to show moderation and restraint, and to help promote the conduct of a successful campaign and the holding of peaceful elections. In that regard, the Group urged the political forces and all other stakeholders in the electoral process to place national unity, cohesion and peace above any partisan considerations and to refrain from any acts liable to endanger the transition.

10. The Group urged the Independent National Electoral Commission and the other transitional institutions, as well as the political forces and the media, to raise awareness about democratic values among the population, including political actors, activists and supporters, to familiarize them with the voting process and to induce them to uphold democratic rules, which implied tolerance, a non-predetermined outcome and acceptance of the verdict of the vote. It also encouraged the stakeholders in the transition to ensure enhanced communication and greater transparency in the electoral progress, particularly for the benefit of the population. The Group also urged the media to act in a professional manner and to contribute to the conduct of a peaceful electoral campaign.

11. The Group welcomed the willingness of His Excellency Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso and Mediator, to continue to support the transition process in Guinea and encouraged him to pursue his efforts aimed at reinforcing constructive and inclusive dialogue among the stakeholders. The Group invited the political parties to intensify and broaden their consultative efforts with a view to the swift conclusion of a comprehensive political agreement, including a code of conduct and a monitoring mechanism.

12. The Group underlined the importance of justice, reconciliation and the fight against impunity as prerequisites for maintaining social cohesion in the transition process. In that regard, it commended the actions taken by the National Transitional

Council and welcomed the opening of an office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

13. The Group took note of the final report of the joint ECOWAS-African Union-United Nations group of experts on reform of the defence and security sector. The Group requested the Government of Guinea to take the necessary steps to facilitate the continued implementation of the security sector reform programme. It called on ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations, in consultation with the Government of Guinea and other interested partners, to develop the modalities for the implementation of its recommendations, including the necessary financial, technical and material support.

14. The Group commended the initiatives adopted by the transitional institutions, which had led to the gradual resumption of cooperation with the international community, particularly the European Union and bilateral partners. It encouraged those institutions to discharge the duties assigned to them as soon as possible in order to invigorate cooperation with partners, complete the transition process and promote economic recovery in Guinea.

15. The Group decided to hold its next meeting in Conakry on a date to be determined following consultations by the Co-Chairs.

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General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda items 13, 14 and 18

Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Letter dated 3 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, recorded for the period from 31 March to 1 June 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 13, 14 and 18, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-38911 (E) 100610

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Annex to the letter dated 3 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 31 March to 1 May 2010

N	(Direction)	Date, time	Firing	
			From Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
1.	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	31.03.10 11.00	Firearm	3
2.	Ajgepar	31.03.10 19.30	Firearm	15
3.	Khndzorut	31.03.10 08.40	Firearm	2
4.	Berqaber	02.04.10 00.50	5.45 Machinegun	50
5.	Khndzorut	01.04.10 18.55	Firearm	1
6.	Sarigyukh	02.04.10 10.25	Firearm	1
7.	Ajgepar	02.04.10 13.15	Firearm	10
8.	Movses	03.04.10 12.25	Firearm	15
9.	Khndzorut	03.04.10 20.45	SVD Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	15 40 20
10.	Ajgepar	04.04.10 23.40	7.62 Machinegun Firearm	20 10
11.	Ajgepar	05.04.10 07.30	Firearm	4
12.	Ajgepar	05.04.10 13.10	Firearm	15
13.	Ajgepar	05.04.10 21.10	Firearm	20
14.	Artsvaberd	05.04.10 13.45	Firearm	25
15.	Voskepar	05.04.10 14.05	Firearm	5
16.	Voskepar	05.04.10 14.20	Firearm	8
17.	Bardzruni	05.04.10 21.50	Firearm	1

18.	Bardzruni	05.04.10 22.40	Firearm	2
19.	Artsvaberd	06.04.10 14.50	SVD	7
20.	Shavarshavan	07.04.10 10.55	Firearm	3
21.	Shavarshavan	07.04.10 18.25	SVD	1
22.	Berdavan	07.04.10 18.50	Firearm SVD	100 10
23.	Chinari	07.04.10 12.10	12.7 Machinegun	4
24.	Movses	09.04.10 19.40	SVD	2
25.	Bardzruni	09.04.10 23.40	SVD	2
26.	Berqaber	10.04.10 12.50	Firearm	5
27.	Aygepar	10.04.10 14.00	Firearm	10
28.	Chinari	10.04.10 14.30	12.7 Machinegun	4
29.	Chinari	12.04.10 01.00	SVD	4
30.	Berdavan	13.04.10 09.40	Firearm	10
31.	Artsvaberd	13.04.10 13.40	Firearm	8
32.	Chinari	13.04.10 13.50	SVD	4
33.	Chinari	13.04.10 14.00	SVD 7.62 Machinegun	2 20
34.	Voskepar	14.04.10 12.45	7.62 Machinegun	10
35.	Shavarshavan	14.04.10 15.55	7.62 Machinegun	16
36.	Jokhaj	14.04.10 13.30	7.62 Machinegun	3
37.	Ajgepar	15.04.10 11.30	Firearm	1
38.	Berqaber	15.04.10 21.30	5.45 Machinegun	16
39.	Shavarshavan	15.04.10 22.30	Firearm	3
40.	Ajgepar	15.04.10 21.50	Firearm	7

41.	Paravaqar	16.04.10Â. Â. 22.00	Firearm	5
42.	Berqaber	16.04.10 14.30	SVD	6
43.	Shavarshavan	16.04.10 20.50	Firearm	3
44.	-- Paravaqar	17.04.10 18.00	Firearm	10
45.	Paravaqar	17.04.10 21.00	Firearm	10
46.	Paravaqar	17.04.10 21.00	Firearm	10
47.	Paravaqar	17.04.10 21.00	Firearm	10
48.	Chinari	18.04.10 00.45	Firearm SVD	10 6
49.	Jokhaj	18.04.10 14.40	7.62 Machinegun SVD	50 20
50.	Jokhaj	18.04.10 19.00	7.62 Machinegun SVD	40 28
51.	Bakhanis	18.04.10Â. Â. 21.30	Firearm	5
52.	Dovekh	19.04.10 15.45	Firearm	31
53.	Khndzorut	19.04.10 22.19	Firearm	3
54.	Paravaqar	20.04.10 21.30	Firearm	10
55.	Paravaqar	20.04.10 21.30	Firearm	6
56.	Eraskh	21.04.10 13.15	Firearm	4
57.	Paravaqar	23.04.10 08.00	Firearm	3
58.	Berqaber	23.04.10 16.00	7.62 Machinegun SVD	10 5
59.	Sarigyukh	24.04.10 14.30	Firearm	3
60.	Koti	24.04.10 13.25	Firearm	5
61.	Chinari	24.04.10 15.10	7.62 Machinegun	9
62.	Chinari	24.04.10 15.21	Firearm	2

63.	Khndzorut	25.04.10 06.00	Firearm	6
64.	Ajgepar	25.04.10 17.00	Firearm	4
65.	Bardzruni	25.04.10 18.15	Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	3 3
66.	Berdavan	26.04.10 12.10	Firearm	1
67.	Berdavan	26.04.10 13.10	Firearm	1
68.	Koti	26.04.10 17.00	Firearm	2
69.	Shavarshavan	26.04.10 17.20	7.62 Machinegun 12.7 Machinegun	20 2
70.	Shavarshavan	26.04.10 19.50	7.62 Machinegun	2
71.	Khndzorut	26.04.10 16.10	Firearm	15
72.	Bardzruni	26.04.10 19.40	Firearm	20
73.	Bardzruni	26.04.10 21.10	12.7 Sniper Weapon Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	4 15 10
74.	Koti	27.04.10 15.15	7.62 Machinegun	5
75.	Ajgepar	28.04.10 00.30	Firearm	20
76.	Marzili	28.04.10 12.30	Firearm	10
77.	Marzili	28.04.10 17.15	Firearm	7
78.	Bash Qarvend	29.04.10 02.38	Firearm	4
79.	Qyurdlar	28.04.10 18.25	SVD	1
80.	Chakhrli	28.04.10 21.05	Firearm	1
81.	Vahan	28.04.10 10.50	Firearm	3
82.	Ajgepar	29.04.10 13.25	Firearm	4
83.	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	30.04.10 17.10	Firearm	5

84.	Barekamavan	30.04.10 19.45	Firearm	13
85.	Barekamavan	30.04.10 20.10	Firearm	3
86.	Bardzruni	30.04.10 11.45-13.07	12.7 Sniper Weapon	8
87.	~~ Bardzruni	30.04.10 15.55	12.7 Sniper Weapon	3
88.	Bardzruni	30.04.10 23.30	Firearm	2
89.	Bardzruni	01.05.10 18.30	Firearm	6

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from **1 April to 1 May 2010**:

Number of violations – 89.

Shots – about 1043 (PK ~ 238, RPK ~ 66, SVD- 113, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 12, sniper weapon 12.7 mm - 15, AK ~ 599).

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh from **1 April to 1 May 2010**:

Number of violations – 323.

Shots – about 2092 (PK ~ 190, SVD- 151, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 26, sniper weapon 12.7 mm - 8, AK ~ 1711, NSVT 12.7 mm - 6).

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 May to 1 June 2010

N	(Direction)	Date, time	Firing	
			From Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
1.	Shavarshavan	02.05.10 12.00	Firearm	3
2.	Barekamavan	02.05.10 16.05	Firearm	5
3.	Khndzorut	02.05.10 11.30	Firearm	3
4.	Khndzorut	02.05.10 15.40	Firearm	2
5.	Khndzorut	02.05.10 22.40	Firearm	1
6.	Khndzorut	02.05.10 23.10	SVD	1
7.	Barekamavan	04.05.10 18.15	Firearm	2
8.	Bardzruni	04.05.10 12.30	12.7 Sniper Weapon	4
9.	Bardzruni	04.05.10 12.45	12.7 Sniper Weapon	2
10.	Bardzruni	04.05.10 18.25	Firearm	1
11.	Khndzorut	04.05.10 18.25	Firearm SVD	1 4
12.	Bardzruni	04.05.10 18.45	7.62 Machinegun SVD	5 1
13.	Bardzruni	04.05.10 21.30	Firearm SVD 12.7 Sniper Weapon	30 10 1
14.	Bardzruni	04.05.10 21.30	Firearm SVD	20 5
15.	Berdavan	05.05.10 21.40	Firearm	1
16.	Berqaber	05.05.10 22.40	Firearm	5
17.	Berqaber	06.05.10 01.00	Firearm	30
18.	Berqaber	06.05.10 03.55	5.45 Machinegun	15
19.	Berqaber	06.05.10 17.25	7.62 Machinegun SVD	25 12
20.	Shavarshavan	06.05.10 23.30	Firearm	10

21.	Berdavan	07.05.10 03.20	Firearm	20
22.	Bardzruni	06.05.10 12.15	Firearm	4
23.	Bardzruni	08.05.10 11.40	12.7 Sniper Weapon	2
24.	Bardzruni	08.05.10 14.45	Firearm	7
25.	Bardzruni	08.05.10 14.50	Firearm	14
26.	Bardzruni	08.05.10 19.40	Firearm	1
27.	Khndzorut	08.05.10 22.00	Firearm	1
28.	Khndzorut	08.05.10 22.20	SVD	4
29.	Khndzorut	08.05.10 22.45	Firearm	2
30.	Khndzorut	08.05.10 22.50	Firearm SVD	22 8
31.	Khndzorut	08.05.10 23.25	Firearm	1
32.	Khndzorut	08.05.10 23.40	SVD	4
33.	Khndzorut	08.05.10 23.40	SVD	2
34.	Bardzruni	08.05.10 23.40	SVD	1
35.	Khndzorut	09.05.10 13.55	Firearm	2
36.	Dovekh	11.05.10 14.30	Firearm	5
37.	Choratan	11.05.10 14.40	12.7 Machinegun	2
38.	Berdavan	11.05.10 19.50	Firearm	4
39.	Bardzruni	11.05.10 11.55	Firearm SVD	4 1
40.	Bardzruni	11.05.10 13.30	12.7 Sniper Weapon	4
41.	Bardzruni	11.05.10 14.05	Firearm	7
42.	Bardzruni	11.05.10 15.15	SVD	1
43.	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	12.05.10 12.50	SVD	2
44.	Movses	12.05.10 18.40	Firearm	15
45.	Berdavan	12.05.10 23.35	Firearm	4
46.	Kirats	13.05.10 01.10	Firearm	4

47.	Bardzruni	12.05.10 19.10	Firearm	1
48.	Khndzorut	12.05.10 21.20	12.7 Sniper Weapon	3
49.	Khndzorut	12.05.10 21.45	7.62 Machinegun	20
50.	Khndzorut	13.05.10 16.45	12.7 Sniper Weapon	6
51.	Khndzorut	13.05.10 17.35	12.7 Machinegun	6
52.	Khndzorut	13.05.10 20.20	Firearm	7
53.	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	14.05.10 13.40	7.62 Machinegun	10
54.	Berqaber	14.05.10 14.10	12.7 Machinegun	12
55.	Berqaber	14.05.10 14.10	7.62 Machinegun	3
56.	Berdavan	14.05.10 20.30	Firearm	4
57.	Berdavan	15.05.10 00.15	7.62 Machinegun SVD	6 2
58.	Khndzorut	14.05.10 11.50	12.7 Sniper Weapon SVD	1 3
59.	Bardzruni	14.05.10 12.30	12.7 Sniper Weapon	3
60.	Bardzruni	14.05.10 13.45	12.7 Sniper Weapon	4
61.	Berqaber	15.05.10 09.40	7.62 Machinegun	15
62.	Berqaber	15.05.10 11.50	SVD	5
63.	Bardzruni	16.05.10 13.10-13.30	Firearm 12.7 Sniper Weapon	30 10
64.	Bardzruni	16.05.10 16.30	SVD 12.7 Sniper Weapon	4 4
65.	Bardzruni	16.05.10 17.30	SVD	15
66.	Bardzruni	16.05.10 23.35	SVD	3
67.	Movses	17.05.10 17.50	Firearm	6
68.	Movses	17.05.10 18.05	Firearm	6

69.	Movses	17.05.10 18.05	Firearm	12
70.	Berqaber	17.05.10 19.25	Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	5 15
71.	Bardzruni	17.05.10 12.20	SVD	4
72.	Bardzruni	17.05.10 12.55	5.45 Machinegun	3
73.	Bardzruni	17.05.10 17.05	5.45 Machinegun	3
74.	Bardzruni	17.05.10 17.15	5.45 Machinegun	2
75.	Bardzruni	17.05.10 18.10	SVD	6
76.	Bardzruni	17.05.10 21.10	SVD 5.45 Machinegun	2 10
77.	Barekamavan	18.05.10 23.35	Firearm	4
78.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 10.55	SVD	1
79.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 12.45	SVD	1
80.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 12.50	7.62 Machinegun	6
81.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 13.00	Firearm	2
82.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 13.20	SVD	2
83.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 13.45	SVD	2
84.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 13.50	SVD	2
85.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 17.45	12.7 Sniper Weapon	4
86.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 17.50	SVD	2
87.	Bardzruni	18.05.10 19.45	SVD	4
88.	Bardzruni	19.05.10 10.30	SVD	2
89.	Bardzruni	19.05.10 19.30	SVD	1
90.	Bardzruni	19.05.10 20.05	SVD	1
91.	Bardzruni	19.05.10 20.40	SVD	1
92.	Khndzorut	20.05.10 11.50	Firearm	2

93.	Bardzruni	20.05.10 12.25	SVD	2
94.	Bardzruni	20.05.10 12.35	SVD	2
95.	Bardzruni	20.05.10 13.55	SVD	1
96.	Gnishik	20.05.10 14.40	Firearm	10
97.	Nerqin Karmiraxbyur	21.05.10 15:30	Firearm	3
98.	Berqaber	21.05.10Ã. Â. 17:15	12.7 Machinegun 7.62 Machinegun	10 4
99.	Bardzruni	21.05.10Ã. Â. 11:35	SVD	4
100.	Khndzorut	21.05.10 12:30	Firearm	18
101.	Bardzruni	21.05.10 13:10	SVD	1
102.	Bardzruni	21.05.10 Â. 16:30	SVD	2
103.	Bardzruni	21.05.10Ã. 20:30	SVD	2
104.	Khndzorut	21.05.10 21. 50	Firearm 7.62 Machinegun	10 10
105.	Khndzorut	21.05.10 01:22	Firearm	20
106.	Berqaber	22.05.10 14:50	7.62 Machinegun	25
107.	Berqaber	22.05.10 19:50	12.7 Machinegun 7.62 Machinegun	12 25
108.	Berqaber	22.05.10 20:30	12.7 Machinegun 7.62 Machinegun	50 100
109.	Movses	22.05.10 19:40	Firearm	6
110.	Berdavan	22.05.10 22:35	Firearm	10
111.	Bardzruni	22.05.10Ã. Â. 13:15	Firearm	4
112.	Bardzruni	22.05.10 13:30	7.62 Machinegun	2
113.	Bardzruni	22.05.10 15:00	Firearm	5

114.	Bardzruni	21.05.10 21:20	SVD 7.62 Machinegun	1 2
115.	Ajgepar	23.05.10 22:20	Firearm	3
116.	Bardzruni	23.05.10 15:35	SVD	3
117.	Bardzruni	23.05.10 16:50	SVD	1
118.	Bardzruni	23.05.10 17:30	SVD	1
119.	Bardzruni	23.05.10 19:55	SVD	2
120.	Bardzruni	23.05.10 20:30	SVD	1
121.	Movses	24.05.10 13:15	Firearm	2
122.	Movses	24.05.10 17:50	Firearm	2
123.	Bardzruni	24.05.10 10:00	7.62 Machinegun SVD	20 2
124.	Bardzruni	24.05.10 10:45	7.62 Machinegun	3
125.	Bardzruni	24.05.10 12:25	SVD	1
126.	Bardzruni	24.05.10 01:45	5.45 Machinegun	100
127.	Berqaber	25.05.10 17:20	12.7 Machinegun 7.62 Machinegun SVD	5 30 10
128.	Berqaber	25.05.10 19:10	14.5 Machinegun 12.7 Machinegun	20 10
129.	Chinari	25.05.10 17:45	Firearm SVD	70 15
130.	Berqaber	26.05.10 08:00	7.62 Machinegun SVD Firearm	20 10 30
131.	Berqaber	26.05.10 19:30	7.62 Machinegun 12.7 Machinegun	30 20
132.	Aygedzor	26.05.10 22:45	SVD Firearm	5 2
133.	Berdavan	26.05.10 22:35	Firearm	8

134.	Khndzorut	26.05.10 18:45	Firearm	4
135.	Vazashen	28.05.10 01:00	Firearm	20
136.	Dovegh	28.05.10 02:25	Firearm	30
137.	Bardzruni	27.05.10 11:30	Firearm	1
138.	Bardzruni	27.05.10 11:45	Firearm SVD	5 1
139.	Bardzruni	27.05.10 11:55	SVD	5
140.	Bardzruni	27.05.10 21:35	Firearm	15
141.	Bardzruni	27.05.10 22:50	Firearm	5
142.	Bardzruni	27.05.10 23:05	Firearm	4
143.	Bardzruni	27.05.10 23:15	Firearm SVD	10 4
144.	Barekamavan	29.05.10 00:40	Firearm	15
145.	Bardzruni	28.05.10 09:20	Firearm	4
146.	Bardzruni	28.05.10 09:25	SVD	5
147.	Bardzruni	28.05.10 13:00	Firearm	1
148.	Bardzruni	28.05.10 14:50	Firearm	8
149.	Ajgepar	29.05.10 16:45	Firearm	4
150.	Ajgepar	29.05.10 23:20	Firearm	10
151.	Khndzorut	29.05.10 17:25	Firearm	15
152.	Bardzruni	29.05.10 19:45	Firearm SVD	1 4
153.	Berdavan	30.05.10 19:30	Firearm	1
154.	Bazanis	30.05.10 20:15	SVD	3
155.	Vazashen	01.06.10 00.10	Firearm	10

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from **1 May to 1 June 2010**:

Number of violations – 155.

Shots – about 1587 (PK ~ 376, RPK 5.45 mm ~ 133, SVD- 207, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 132, machine gun 14.5 mm ~ 20, sniper weapon 12.7 mm - 48, AK ~ 671).

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh from **1 May to 1 June 2010**:

Number of violations – 281.

Shots – about 1880 (PK ~ 96, SVD- 126, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 31, sniper weapon 12.7 mm - 4, AK ~ 1623).

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Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Letter dated 2 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba concerning the attack perpetrated by Israel against the humanitarian aid flotilla to Gaza (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the above-mentioned statement circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 16, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Pedro **Núñez Mosquera**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-38922 (E) 070610 070610

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Annex to the letter dated 2 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba has learned with deep concern of the criminal attack perpetrated by the special forces of the Israeli army in the early hours of 31 May against a flotilla of ships that was in international waters and was carrying humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people living in the Gaza Strip, an attack in which a number of those aboard the flotilla were killed or injured.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemns this devious criminal attack by the Government of Israel in the strongest terms, and calls upon the international community and peace-loving peoples to demand that the Israeli authorities immediately lift the illegal, merciless and genocidal blockade against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.

Cuba wishes to convey its most heartfelt condolences to the families of the victims, and reiterates its support for and solidarity with the just cause of the Palestinian people and its inalienable rights, including the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Havana, 31 May 2010

United Nations S/2010/281

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 June 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 4 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to bring to the attention of the Security Council the armed attack on 26 March 2010 by North Korea against the Republic of Korea Navy ship *Cheonan* (PCC-772) on patrol duties in the territorial waters of the Republic of Korea, 2.5 km off the south-western coast of Baekryong Island. The attack resulted in the sinking of the 1,200 ton corvette leading to the deaths of 46 Republic of Korea servicemen on board.

The attack by North Korea was substantiated in the investigation conducted by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group of the Republic of Korea with the participation of international experts from Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force, comprising the Republic of Korea, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (see annex). Based on material evidence obtained through scientific and objective investigation, it was determined that the sinking was caused by an underwater explosion by a torpedo made in North Korea. The investigation result further established that additional evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine. This corroborates that North Korea is responsible for the armed attack.

The armed attack by North Korea against the Republic of Korea Navy ship is a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement and the 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North. As such, the armed attack by North Korea constitutes a threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

My Government requests that the Security Council duly consider this matter and respond in a manner appropriate to the gravity of North Korea's military provocation in order to deter the recurrence of any further provocation by North Korea.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Park** In-kook
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea
to the United Nations

10-38932 (E) 070610

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Annex to the letter dated 4 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Investigation result on the sinking of Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan*

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I. Overview

1. The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group conducted its investigation with 25 experts from 10 top Korean expert agencies, 22 military experts, 3 experts recommended by the National Assembly, and 24 foreign experts, constituting 4 support teams from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sweden. The Group is composed of four teams — scientific investigation, explosive analysis, ship structure management and intelligence analysis.

2. We provide the results obtained by the Korean and foreign experts through an investigation and validation process undertaken with a scientific and objective approach.

3. The results obtained through an investigation and analysis of the deformation of the hull recovered from the seabed (see attachment 1) and evidence collected from the site of the incident are as follows:

> The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group assesses that a strong underwater explosion generated by the detonation of a homing torpedo below and to the left of the gas turbine room caused the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan* to split apart and sink.

II. Basis of the assessment

4. The basis of our assessment that the sinking was caused by a torpedo attack is as follows:

(a) Precise measurement and analysis of the damaged part of the hull (see attachment 2) indicates that:

> (i) A shockwave and bubble effect caused significant upward bending of the Centre vertical keel, compared with its original state, and the shell plate was steeply bent, with some parts of the ship fragmented;
>
> (ii) On the main deck, fracture occurred around the large openings used for maintenance of equipment in the gas turbine room, and significant upward deformation is present on the port side. Also, the bulkhead of the gas turbine room was significantly damaged and deformed;
>
> (iii) The bottoms of the stern and bow sections at the failure point were bent upward. This also proves that an underwater explosion took place;

(b) Through a thorough investigation of the inside and outside of the ship, we have found evidence of extreme pressure on the fin stabilizer, a mechanism to reduce significant rolling of the ship; water pressure and bubble effects on the bottom of the hull; and wires cut with no traces of heat (see attachment 3). All these point to a strong shockwave and bubble effect causing the splitting and the sinking of the ship;

(c) We have analysed statements by survivors of the incident and a sentry on Baekryong Island:

> (i) The survivors made a statement that they heard a near-simultaneous explosion once or twice, and that water splashed on the face of a port-side lookout who fell from the impact;

(ii) A sentry on the shore of Baekryong Island stated that he witnessed an approximately 100-meter-high "pillar of white flash" for 2-3 seconds. The aforementioned phenomenon is consistent with damage resulting from a shockwave and bubble effect;

(d) Regarding the medical examination of the deceased service members, no trace of fragmentation or burn injury were found, but fractures and lacerations were observed. All of these are consistent with damage resulting from a shockwave and bubble effect;

(e) The seismic and infrasound wave analysis result conducted by the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources is as follows:

(i) Seismic wave intensity of 1.5 degrees was detected by 4 stations;

(ii) Two infrasound waves with a 1.1 second interval were detected by 11 stations;

(iii) The seismic and infrasound waves originated from an identical site of explosion;

(iv) This phenomenon corresponds to a shockwave and bubble effect generated by an underwater explosion;

(f) Numerous simulations of an underwater explosion show that a detonation with a net explosive weight of 200-300 kg occurred at a depth of about 6-9 m, approximately 3 m left of the centre of the gas turbine room;

(g) Based on the analysis of tidal currents off Baekryong Island, the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group determined that the currents would not prohibit a torpedo attack.

III. Conclusive evidence

5. As for conclusive evidence that can corroborate the use of a torpedo, we have collected propulsion parts, including a propulsion motor with propellers and a steering section from the site of the sinking. The evidence matched in size and shape with the specifications on the drawing presented in introductory materials provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes (see attachment 4). The marking in Hangul (Korean alphabet), which reads "1 번 (or No. 1)", found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo (see attachment 5). The above evidence allowed the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group to confirm that the recovered parts had been made in North Korea.

6. Also, the aforementioned result confirmed that other possible causes raised for the sinking, including grounding, fatigue failure, mines, collision and internal explosion, played no part in the incident.

IV. Conclusions

7. The following sums up the opinions of Korean and foreign experts on the conclusive evidence collected from the incident site: hull deformation; statements of

relevant personnel; medical examination of the deceased service members; analysis of seismic and infrasound waves; simulation of underwater explosion; and analysis on currents off Baekryong Island and collected torpedo parts.

8. The Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan* was split apart and sunk owing to a shockwave and bubble effect produced by an underwater torpedo explosion.

9. The explosion occurred approximately 3 m left of the centre of the gas turbine room, at a depth of about 6-9 m.

10. The weapon system used is confirmed to be a high explosive torpedo with a net explosive weight of about 250 kg, manufactured by North Korea.

11. In addition, the findings of the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force, comprising five States including the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, and operating since 4 May, are as follows:

- The North Korean military is in possession of a fleet of about 70 submarines, comprising approximately 20 Romeo class submarines (1,800 tons), 40 Sango class submarines (300 tons) and 10 midget submarines, including the Yeono class (70-80 tons)
- It also possesses torpedoes of various capabilities, including straight running, acoustic and wake homing torpedoes, with a net explosive weight of about 200 to 300 kg, which can deliver the same level of damage that was delivered to the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan*.

12. Given the aforementioned findings, combined with the operational environment in the vicinity of the site of the incident, we assess that a small submarine is an underwater weapon system that operates in these operational environment conditions. We confirmed that a few small submarines and a mother ship supporting them left a North Korean naval base in the West Sea 2-3 days prior to the attack and returned to port 2-3 days after the attack.

13. Furthermore, we confirmed that all submarines from neighbouring countries were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident.

14. The torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a dredging ship on 15 May, which include the 5 x 5 bladed contrarotating propellers, propulsion motor and a steering section, perfectly match the schematics of the CHT-02D torpedo included in introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes. The marking in Hangul, which reads "1번 (or No. 1)", found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo. Russian and Chinese torpedoes are marked in their respective languages. The CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by North Korea utilizes acoustic/wake homing and passive acoustic tracking methods. It is a heavyweight torpedo with a diameter of 21 inches, a weight of 1.7 tons and a net explosive weight of up to 250 kg.

15. Based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis, we have reached the clear conclusion that the Republic of Korea ship *Cheonan* was sunk as the result of an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in North Korea. The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine. There is no other plausible explanation.

Attachment 1

Cheonan before sinking (above) compared with recovered hull (below)



Attachment 2

Upward bending of the hull caused by a shockwave and bubble effect



Attachment 3

Various traces of damage caused by a shockwave and bubble effect



Attachment 4

Torpedo fragments collected from seabed matching North Korean torpedo specifications



Picture of CHT-02D torpedo in the North Korean brochure for export purposes

Diameter: 21 inch (59.4 cm), length: 7.35 m, charge: 250 kg

Attachment 5

Comparison of Hangul (Korean alphabet) marking found on North Korean torpedo fragments

Hangul marking on propulsion section of CHT-02D

Hangul marking on a previously obtained North Korean torpedo

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United Nations S/2010/282

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 June 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 3 June 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1904 (2009), adopted on 17 December 2009, by which the Council decided that, when considering delisting requests, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities would be assisted by an Office of the Ombudsperson, to be established for an initial period of 18 months from the date of adoption of the resolution. In the same resolution, the Council requested me, in close consultation with the Committee, to appoint an eminent individual of high moral character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications and experience in relevant fields, such as legal, human rights, counter-terrorism and sanctions, to be Ombudsperson with the mandate outlined in annex II of the resolution.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, following due consultation with the Committee and taking into account the requirements set out in paragraph 20 of resolution 1904 (2009), I have appointed the following individual to be Ombudsperson for a period ending 30 June 2011:

Kimberly Prost (Canada)

I should be grateful if you could bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

10-38956 (E) 040610

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United Nations S/2010/283

Security Council

Distr: General
9 June 2010

Original: English

France, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009) and *reaffirming* their provisions,

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and *recalling* the right of States Party in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007 (GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/115), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

[redacted]

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Reaffirming that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on Iran,

Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as "Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution"), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

Noting with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,

Also noting the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82), which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the facility's purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the IAEA,

Noting with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,

Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA's right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, and *emphasizing* that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the IAEA's right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and *commending* the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme,

Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and *noting* in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,

Emphasizing also, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,

Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June 2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and *noting* the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008), and *recalling* in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran's revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and *further noting* that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,

Having regard to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,

Recalling that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean activities,

Calling for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by Iran at an early date,

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the threat of force,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Affirms* that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008);

2. *Affirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which

are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, *further affirms* its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

3. *Reaffirms* that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, and *stresses* the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;

4. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;

5. *Decides* that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, *calls upon* Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, *calls upon* Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and *reaffirms* that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, Iran's Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and *notes* that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement;

6. *Reaffirms* that, in accordance with Iran's obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;

7. *Decides* that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology-related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and *further decides* that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them;

8. *Decides* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as

determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) ("the Committee"), *decides* further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9. *Decides* that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

10. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), *underlines* that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and *decides* that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

11. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

12. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as "Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution") individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

13. *Decides* that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related

activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further *decides* that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be superseded by the list of items contained in S/2010/263;

14. *Calls upon* all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

15. *Notes* that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and *calls upon* all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

16. *Decides* to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and *decides* further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

17. *Requires* any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, *further requires* such States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

18. *Decides* that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian

purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and *underlines* that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;

19. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

20. *Requests* all Member States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air's cargo division or vessels owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

21. *Calls upon* all States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

22. *Decides* that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran's jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

23. *Calls upon* States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to

believe that these activities could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

24. *Calls upon* States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

25. *Deplores* the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), and *commends* States that have taken action to respond to these violations and report them to the Committee;

26. *Directs* the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, and *recalls* that the Committee may designate individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, these resolutions;

27. *Decides* that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;

28. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008), shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;

29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

30. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

31. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24;

32. *Stresses* the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the June 2008 proposal, and *acknowledges with appreciation* that the June 2008 proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;

33. *Encourages* the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks, and *encourages* Iran to respond positively to such proposals;

34. *Commends* the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, *regrets* that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and *encourages* the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council's resolutions;

35. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution;

36. *Requests* within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

37. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors; (c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and *underlines* that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

38. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

Entities

1. **Amin Industrial Complex**: Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006).

Location: P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District, Mashad, Iran; Kaveh Complex, Khalaj Rd., Seyedi St., Mashad, Iran

A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company

2. **Armament Industries Group**: Armament Industries Group (AIG) manufacturers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.

Location: Sepah Islam Road, Karaj Special Road Km 10, Iran; Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

3. **Defense Technology and Science Research Center**: Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees Iran's defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.

Location: Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

4. **Doostan International Company**: Doostan International Company (DICO) supplies elements to Iran's ballistic missile program.

5. **Farasakht Industries**: Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or controlled by MODAFL.

Location: P.O. Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28, Esfahan-Tehran Freeway, Shahin Shahr, Esfahan, Iran

6. **First East Export Bank, P.L.C.**: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile, and defense entities.

Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan, Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number LL06889 (Malaysia)

7. **Kaveh Cutting Tools Company**: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.

Location: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4 of Khalaj Road, End of Seyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Khalaj Rd., End of Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran; Moqan St., Pasdaran St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran

8. **M. Babaie Industries**: M. Babaie Industries is subordinate to Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1737 (2006).

Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran

9. **Malek Ashtar University**: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL. This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center (PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear program.

Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran

10. **Ministry of Defense Logistics Export**: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or related materiel.

Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran

11. **Mizan Machinery Manufacturing**: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.

Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran

A.K.A.: 3MG

12. **Modern Industries Technique Company**: Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor.

Location: Arak, Iran

A.K.A.: Rahkar Company, Rahkar Industries, Rahkar Sanaye Company, Rahkar Sanaye Novin

13. **Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine**: The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI's center for the development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.

Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran

A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji Agricultural and Medical Research Center

14. **Pejman Industrial Services Corporation**: Pejman Industrial Services Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran

15. **Sabalan Company**: Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

16. **Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO)**: SAPICO is a cover name for SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

17. **Shahid Karrazi Industries**: Shahid Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Tehran, Iran

18. **Shahid Satarri Industries**: Shahid Sattari Industries is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Southeast Tehran, Iran

A.K.A.: Shahid Sattari Group Equipment Industries

19. **Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries**: Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.

Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran

20. **Special Industries Group**: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

21. **Tiz Pars**: Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which could make a material contribution to Iran's missile program, on behalf of SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

22. **Yazd Metallurgy Industries**: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box 89195-678, Yazd, Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran

A.K.A.: Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries, Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries

Individuals

Javad Rahiqi: Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (additional information: DOB: 24 April 1954; POB: Marshad).

Annex II

Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

1. **Fater (or Faater) Institute**: Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC projects in Iran.

2. **Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem**: Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is owned or controlled by KAA.

3. **Ghorb Karbala**: Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.

4. **Ghorb Nooh**: Ghorb Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA.

5. **Hara Company**: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

6. **Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute**: Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, KAA.

7. **Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters**: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects. In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.

8. **Makin**: Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.

9. **Omran Sahel**: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

10. **Oriental Oil Kish**: Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

11. **Rah Sahel**: Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

12. **Rahab Engineering Institute**: Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.

13. **Sahel Consultant Engineers**: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

14. **Sepanir**: Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

15. **Sepasad Engineering Company**: Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

Annex III

Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

1. **Irano Hind Shipping Company**

   Location: 18 Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Vali-e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to Mehrshad, Sedaghat St., Opposite of Mellat Park, Vali Asr Ave., Tehran 1A001, Iran

2. **IRISL Benelux NV**

   Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number BE480224531 (Belgium)

3. **South Shipping Line Iran** (SSL)

   Location: Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi Ave., Tehran, Iran; Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran

Annex IV

Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union

Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran

Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran

In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness:

to recognize Iran's right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;

to treat Iran's nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored.

Nuclear Energy

- Reaffirmation of Iran's right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
- Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
- Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
- Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually restored.
- Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
- Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

Political

- Improving the six countries' and the EU's relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.
- Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
- Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.

- Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues.
- Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security.
- Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
- Support for a conference on regional security issues.
- Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.
- Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.

Economic

Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving Iran's access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.

Energy Partnership

Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy: establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.

Agriculture

- Support for agricultural development in Iran.

Facilitation of Iran's complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.

Environment, Infrastructure

- Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure, science and technology, and high-tech:
  - Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport corridors.
  - Support for modernization of Iran's telecommunication infrastructure, including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.

Civil Aviation

- Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:
  - Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;
  - Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety standards.

Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues

- Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran's economic and social development and humanitarian need.
- Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran:
  - Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
  - Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration, history and philosophy.
- Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).
- Cooperation within the framework of a "dialogue among civilizations".

Implementation mechanism

- Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future agreement.